Labour, antisemitism and the news: A response to critics
Last week the Media Reform Coalition published research which found systematic patterns of inaccurate and misleading coverage in relation to antisemitism within the Labour Party. This has been met by strident critique and condemnation by some journalists and political actors on social media platforms. I would like to stress that I value all forms of constructive feedback — including critical feedback — that engages directly with the research, including the methodology and approach adopted, as well as the conclusions drawn. I am grateful to those who have engaged in that way, though sadly and perhaps inevitably, much of the feedback has been highly politicised and personalised. I have nevertheless attempted to distil and respond to all of the feedback received as follows:
1. The research is inherently biased
Most of the critical feedback on Twitter has blanketly dismissed the research as partisan and biased based on either my own personal politics or the presumed partisan bias of the Media Reform Coalition (which commissioned and published the research).
To be clear, my own association with the Labour Party — as well as the group Jewish Voice for Labour — is appropriately declared up front in the report, as is the fact that my co-researcher has no such associations and does not consider herself a regular Labour voter.
It would of course be absurd to claim that personal politics has no bearing on the motivations for such research, or that any research is entirely free of subjective influence. But to dismiss the value of research on that basis alone is effectively to dismiss the value of any research that engages with matters of public controversy and debate. Even beyond academia, the value of much analysis produced by investigative journalists, or by think tanks or NGOs must, by logical extension, be considered redundant since everyone is political, whether or not their particular leanings or associations are declared or transparent.
More importantly, such dismissals fail to take account of the particular conventions adopted in academic studies to minimise or mitigate the risk of subjective influence, and the fact that we went to relatively extreme lengths in this regard, as detailed in our report. For a start, our research does not engage directly with questions of media bias at all, precisely to avoid interpretive judgements about ‘slant’. Instead we focus on clear cut examples of inaccurate or misleading coverage which are easily identifiable and clearly sign-posted in our report.
As for the Media Reform Coalition, it is fair to say that it is broadly situated within the progressive left of the political spectrum, based on the kinds of organisations we have partnered with and the kinds of people that have been directly involved. But to suggest that it is a ‘hard left’ or extremist organisation is entirely divorced from reality. Our coordinating committee includes members who have been broadly oppositional towards Jeremy Corbyn in their personal politics, as well as those who have supported him. Most of our partners (as listed on our website) are non-partisan groups whilst some have links to parties other than the Labour Party, including both the Lib Dems and Tories. And to suggest, as some have, that the MRC is a clandestine cover for a group of extremists/Trotskyists/conspiracy theorists warrants no response, except to say that anyone wishing to find out more about the organisation would plainly have no difficulty in getting involved or attending our mostly open and public meetings.
Similar blanket accusations of inherent bias (and worse) have been levelled at academics and other public figures who have endorsed the research. These include some of the most eminent and widely cited experts in the field of media and communications and some who have no allegiance to or association with either the Labour Party or its leadership. It is palpably absurd to dismiss either their credibility or the credibility of the research simply on the basis of (often presumed) political or ideological leanings.
Many of these critics have rightly pointed out that evidence of antisemitism in the Labour Party cannot be dismissed simply on the basis that it is cited and invoked by people who are ideologically opposed to the leadership. The same logic must surely be applied on both counts. We cannot ignore or tolerate evidence of disinformation any more than we can ignore or tolerate evidence of antisemitism. Both must be exposed wherever and whenever they surface, and regardless of who is exposing them or what particular political agendas that exposure may or may not serve.
A subset of these critiques also seems to imply that the research is of little or no value because it was ‘predictable’: the significance or validity of the findings are thus negated because they appear to align with charges of unfair media treatment of Jeremy Corbyn more broadly. This is a particularly bizarre form of criticism. Clearly results aren’t invalidated simply because they confirm a given hypothesis.
Moreover, our findings were nuanced and some were indeed surprising. This includes the remarkable difference between the BBC’s coverage online and on television, as well as the relatively exemplary coverage of the Independent. Although these outlets were somewhat outliers in the sample, their performance provides a useful benchmark with which to assess the wider coverage. It suggests that the persistent reporting failures identified in others, including the Guardian and BBC television news, were not inevitable or unavoidable.
1. The report is or will be used by some to downplay Labour’s problem with antisemitism or unfairly discredit mainstream news organisations
Related to charges of bias have been attempts to delegitimise the research on the basis of how it will be (presumably) used by others. This, again, entirely misconstrues both the purpose and value of such research which plainly addresses a controversial and salient issue in public debate. As such it may well be used by some on either side of that debate in a way that distorts or misrepresents the actual results to serve a particular agenda. To suggest — as some have — that this was in some way part of the research objectives or motivations is as baseless as it is defamatory. It is stated clearly and up front in our report that the research does not speak in any way to the questions of what antisemitism is, how prevalent it is within the Labour Party, nor allegations of smear tactics, and that we start from the well-founded assumption that concerns about antisemitism in the party are genuine.
2. The focus on one issue and one party gives provides a narrow or skewed perspective of the news media’s performance in general
This is a legitimate critique to the extent that it actually engages with the approach taken and evidence produced. The first thing to say here is that our research focuses on an issue that is not marginal but fundamental to mainstream political news discourse, at least over the last six months and more broadly and intermittently over the last three years. Indeed, the issue our research addresses has all but exclusively dominated headlines about the Labour Party and as such provides a useful lens through which to examine media performance. Judging by the words of some of the most outspoken sources critical of the Labour leadership, it is an issue that is not just about specific allegations of antisemitism but rather one which gets to the heart of what the Labour Party is and what its future holds, and thus has profound implications for British politics — and the public interest — at large.
More importantly, however, this critique overlooks an important and fundamental feature of our conclusion which does not attempt to generalise the findings in the way implied, and nor would we need to in order to establish their significance. It could conceivably be argued that findings of systematic bias would not, on their own, substantiate conclusions about media bias against Corbyn more broadly. To put it another way, we could hypothesise that evidence of media bias on this particular issue might be countered by evidence of bias in a conflicting direction were we to examine coverage of other issues or other parties. But we can’t sensibly say that a pattern of inaccurate and distorted coverage on this particular issue may be offset by more accurate and less distorted coverage on other issues. The identification of widespread reporting failures within the bounds of any particular issue context or case study presents a problem in and of itself.
The use of the term ‘disinformation paradigm’ in this respect is not intended to generalise or dramatize our findings. As stated clearly in the introduction, we use this concept to denote systematic reporting failures that privilege a particular agenda or source perspective, which is exactly what we found. This is consistent with the way in which the concept has evolved in the relevant and recent academic literature.
Our findings have far less to say about general patterns of media bias in relation to Corbyn or Labour, compared to the wider question of where and when disinformation surfaces in the news. Specifically, they challenge the oft-held assumption that disinformation is exclusively a problem traceable and reducible to so-called populist or openly partisan digital news platforms.
3. Partisan online news sites are omitted, especially sites like the Canary or Skwawkbox that are read by many on the left
They were examined cursorily and qualitatively as part of the broader background case study research. They weren’t part of our analysis sample for the reasons stated in our report: we are concerned primarily with the news outlets and platforms that reach the widest audiences and particularly those audiences that may not have prior knowledge or understanding of this complex issue and who would, therefore, be more vulnerable to the effects of disinformation.
The Canary may well be read, as has been suggested, “within an influential group of people within the Labour Party”, but that is not the audience we are particularly concerned with. For the same reason we did not include online news sites who are at least as influential amongst conservatives/right wing groups including Breitbart, Westmonster and Order-Order. We are particularly interested in television news given its reach across fragmented and partisan audiences, and hence its potential to shape or influence wider public opinion. We used Reuters 2018 Digital News Report as a benchmark for the top-ranking news providers, according to which the Canary has a reach of less than half The Times (the smallest outlet in our sample) and a small fraction of leading online news brands including the Sun, the Guardian, the Daily Mail and the BBC.
4. The research makes no distinction between opinion/comment and news reports
It does and this is explicated in our report. So, for instance, we do not include contentious claims in opinion pieces as examples of misleading or distorted coverage, and we don’t categorise or count quoted sources from opinion pieces other than the authors themselves. But we do examine them for accuracy in keeping with conventional editorial codes of conduct.
5. Judgement of inaccuracies are flawed because the IHRA is itself ambiguous as to whether or not its member states have adopted the definition individually
This particular criticism was made by a journalist at the Guardian and references a document produced by the IHRA which states that
On 26 May, 2016, the 31 Member Countries of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) adopted a non-legally binding Working Definition of Antisemitism to guide the organization in its work. The IHRA was the first intergovernmental body to adopt a working definition of antisemitism — the result of in-depth discourse between international experts and political representatives.
The statement is indeed ambiguous but this would not preclude journalists from seeking clarification from the IHRA, as we did, which clearly distinguishes between the IHRA’s adoption of the definition as an intergovernmental body, and adoption by individual member states. This clarification was given to us on the record:
To try and clarify: on 26 May, 2016, the Plenary of the IHRA (composed of political representatives of 31 Member Countries) adopted the non-legally binding Working Definition of Antisemitism to guide the organization in its work. In addition, some governments chose to formally adopt or endorse the working definition in their national parliaments. Countries who have not adopted the working definition in their parliaments are of course still free to draw upon it.
Notwithstanding this, our report explicitly makes the point that we did not address the causes of disinformation. It may well be that journalists themselves were misled by sources and did not have the time or orientation to recognise particular claims as contentious or inaccurate. But if a BBC news anchor repeatedly asserts that the definition has been universally adopted, then that is a reporting error irrespective of how or why that error surfaced. And if news reports routinely repeat contentious claims by sources that the definition has been widely or broadly adopted, without any qualification or counter-perspective, that is misleading regardless of how or why the problem surfaced.
On top of that, this amounts to only a subset of the types of reporting failures we identified. No such ambiguities, for instance, could have explained the multiple examples of misquotations relating to comments by Marc Wadsworth at the launch of the Labour’s report into antisemitism in 2016, or the failure to offer or include any right of reply to charges of antisemitism.
6. Sourcing imbalance reflects the Labour Party’s relative silence or lack of engagement
It is certainly true that the Labour Party’s official spokespeople, as well as front bench MPs, did not always take up opportunities to comment or participate in live interviews on this issue. They did, however, issue a number of statements and on the record communications defending the code revisions and highlighting problems with some of the examples appended to the IHRA definition. These responses were regularly omitted even from reports with a specific focus on the code controversy.
Moreover, this was clearly a broad debate with prominent, relevant and vocal sources both within and outside of the Labour Party. In fact, an exclusive reliance on the party’s official responses (versus, for instance, far more wide-ranging sources extolling the virtues of the IHRA definition) was very much part of the problem, as highlighted in our report. We just have to compare the platform on IHRA discussion given to so-called ‘mainstream’ Jewish groups compared to other Jewish groups, BAME and Palestinian groups, prominent Labour activists and MPs critical of IHRA, three senior barristers who have produced legal opinions on it and one former appeals court judge, etc. It is surely to be expected that in any such controversy journalists would strive to seek out and establish the range of perspectives and positions and source stories appropriately.
